An essay supporting expansion of the House of Representatives
After two hundred years of repetition the errors and falsehoods seem to become the conventional wisdom. And the mental block concerning "fear of the multitude" has been fomented since before the birth of the United States. James Madison, prior to, during and after the creation of the United States Constitution was convinced and quite outspoken concerning his deep seated fear of a multitudinous legislature. But perhaps Federalist 55 was his most strident pronouncement of this opinion:
Nothing can be more fallacious than to found our political calculations on arithmetical principles. Sixty or seventy men may be more properly trusted with a given degree of power than six or seven. But it does not follow that six or seven hundred would be proportionably a better depositary. And if we carry on the supposition to six or seven thousand, the whole reasoning ought to be reversed. The truth is, that in all cases a certain number at least seems to be necessary to secure the benefits of free consultation and discussion, and to guard against too easy a combination for improper purposes; as, on the other hand, the number ought at most to be kept within a certain limit, in order to avoid the confusion and intemperance of a multitude. In all very numerous assemblies, of whatever character composed, passion never fails to wrest the sceptre from reason. Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob.
In all my research I have never seen a better example of "fear of the multitude". And what is striking is how Madison seems to conveniently forget his own suggestions concerning government. Madison's own design for the United States government holds the key to this dilemma between adequate representation and mob. His design was called the Virginia Plan and in it he proposed that the Senate be elected by the members of the House and NOT directly by the people. He also proposed that House members were to be subject to recall and that they could not stand for re-election, but this "popular" notion of recall was thrown out very early on and the term of 3 years shortened to 2.
This concept of indirect election in the formation of a "deliberative body" is very important when we observe the true nature of the current House of Representatives: The House is composed of 435 members. But the "deliberative body" of the House is composed of the members of the committee structure of the House (approximately 230 of the 435). These persons are doubly elected in that they are first elected by the people directly and then they are elected again by the members of the House. This is very much like Madison's suggested "Senate". There is a greater permanence for the committee chairs and members than there would be for the more junior representatives simply because the folks back home think twice about giving up the perception of power they enjoy with having "their" guy in the inner circle. The nice thing is that such persons can still be removed by direct vote of the people or by the direct vote of the "representative body". And this latter option is somewhat similar to "recall" in that it can happen at any time.
The "representative body" (the more junior members) of the house may well introduce legislation, but such "suggestion" is then sent to the "deliberative body" of the House, i.e. the committees. The "representative body" (the full membership) then votes on any resulting proposed legislation (the bills reported out of committee). And such votes are recorded for review by those being represented. And owing to this structure within the House a dramatic increase in the "representative body" of the House does not translate into or necessitate any direct alteration of the true "deliberative body" or the procedures of the House at large. The committee structure of the House remains the same. With the advent of electronic voting in the 1970's it takes no longer to count 800, 1600, or 6000 electronic votes than it does to count 435. And the very last characterization of an extension in votes would be as a "mob". Even with four times the current membership in the House, each member of the "representative body" would still be representing more than 180 thousand people. According to Madison a group of thirty thousand can provide a fit candidate for such deliberative work. The reduction in district sizes (the true objective) simply pronounces the voice of the people more accurately because the removal of non-representative "representatives" is much more easily accomplished. If the representative wants to retain the job then the representative had better pronounce the voice of the constituency or (s)he will be replaced in the next election cycle. When coupled with the 100 member senate that blocks any undue populism there is nothing to fear from such an increase in democracy. What is telling is that this solution has already been adopted and aside from the fact that there is still too much control from the top down the arrangement seems to work quite well. Increased membership is not the objective. Increased membership is the price paid for a closer relationship between the people and their representatives that can only be gained by reducing the enormous size of the current and predicted electoral districts. The structure and operation of the House, while not impervious to an expansion of membership, is by no means altered by such an adjustment to electoral district size. And those who advance "fear of the multitude" as a defense for the status quo are behaving disingenuously at best.
My question to any "Democrat" that is against a major increase in the membership of the House is: "Why do you hate democracy"?
My next essay will be on "We couldn't get anything done". (another rhetorical bloviation).